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Editor’s Note: This debate is on Williams v. Illinois, a Supreme Court case that involves the
Confrontation Clause, which entitles a criminal defendant to confront an accusing witness in
court. The issue at hand is whether said clause is infringed when a report not introduced into
evidence at trial is used by an expert to testify about the results of testing that has been
conducted by a non-testifying third party.

Part 1
Dexter’s Dilemma: Rule 703 Does Not Violate the Confrontation Clause
Ronald J. Coleman
Imagine that Dexter Morgan, of the hit Showtime series Dexter, was called to testify at a
criminal trial. Assume that Dexter is a qualified DNA expert and will testify based on his
independent DNA analysis, but he wishes to also tell the jury that his opinion is supported not
only by his experience, qualifications, and knowledge but also in part on the DNA lab report
compiled by an outside lab (in which Dexter had played no role). If the analyst who prepared the
report for the outside lab does not appear to testify at trial, would it violate the constitutional
rights of the defendant in the case if Dexter is permitted to nevertheless disclose the result of the
DNA report?
The answer to this question begins with the right of an accused to confront an adverse witness.
The right to confront an accusatory witness has a lengthy common law history1 and is ensured by
the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right…to be confronted with the witnesses against him[.]”2 Although the Confrontation
Clause grants the defendant a clear right to confront, much less clear is the exact scope and
contours of that right. In recent years, the Supreme Court has had occasion to discuss the
applications of the Confrontation Clause to forensic report cases.3 One issue that the Court will
soon need to consider, in the case of Williams v. Illinois, is the extent to which a criminal
defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights are violated where a court allows an expert witness (like
Dexter) to testify regarding the results of forensic testing conducted by a separate analyst who
did not appear to testify at trial.4 In the following debate, I will argue that the criminal
defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights are not violated by allowance of such a disclosure.
Confrontation Clause Background
In order to better determine whether Dexter’s disclosure violates the criminal defendant’s rights,
a very brief discussion of modern Confrontation Clause jurisprudence is helpful.
In determining whether the protections of the Confrontation Clause apply in a given case, the
current Supreme Court (after Crawford and its progeny) appears to favor a form of statement
analysis. Thus, the Supreme Court’s view appears to be that in a given case, a lower court should
determine whether the statement itself is made for the primary purposes of providing the
equivalent of in-court testimony (in short, is the statement itself “testimonial”). If the court
determines that a given statement is “testimonial,” then the protections of the Confrontation
Clause will attach to it (and admission of the statement would normally require the person
1

See, e.g., Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 140–41; see also 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of
England 373 (1768).
2
U.S. Const. amend. VI; see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
3
See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009); Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
4
See People v. Williams, 939 N.E. 2d 268 (Ill. 2010), cert. granted, No. 10-8505, 2011 WL 2535081 (U.S. June 28,
2011). The Supreme Court will hear this case as Williams v. Illinois.

making the statement to be present at trial for cross-examination, absent certain discrete
circumstances). Under the Court’s form of statement analysis, the protections of the
Confrontation Clause would apply to a statement made by any category of individual so long as
the statement itself is deemed testimonial.
Some have argued for an alternative Confrontation Clause paradigm predicated upon the type of
witness making the statement (rather than the form of the statement itself). One who favors a
type-of-witness analysis might argue that the proper role of the Confrontation Clause is to permit
the criminal defendant to confront a traditional accusatory witness (for instance, one who states
that she saw defendant cross the street and go into the shop with a gun or that she noticed blood
on the defendant’s cloths). A type of witness analysis would also permit a court to determine that
scientific analysts were not the type of witnesses with which the Confrontation Clause is
concerned because the reports they prepare are purportedly neutral (so the statements are not
being made “against” the criminal defendant). If the Court had adopted a type of witness
analysis, then Dexter would certainly have no trouble disclosing the results of the report (and in
fact the report itself could even be admitted into evidence). However, the Court’s consistent
majority position, especially after Melendez-Diaz, Michigan v. Bryant5 and Bullcoming, appears
to be that the form-of-statement analysis governs and that scientific analysts are not exempt from
the Confrontation Clause.
Thus, a somewhat crude statement of the present state of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence in
forensic cases might be that in order to introduce a forensic report in a criminal case, the
prosecution will normally need to produce the preparing analyst in order to support introduction
of the forensic report (absent, of course, unavailability and a prior opportunity to cross-examine).
The Current Debate Background
The prosecution in Dexter’s case, however, is not attempting to introduce the report itself into
evidence. Instead, Dexter is merely attempting to orally disclose the results of the report in an
effort to support his opinion in the case. Unlike a “lay witness,” an expert witness like Dexter is
generally entitled to offer an opinion on matters of which the expert may not have personal
knowledge. The idea is that the expert’s testimony will help aid the jury or judge in
understanding complex issues. With the guidance of the expert, the jury will be better placed to
exercise its own independent judgment in determining guilt or innocence.
In order for the jury to evaluate the credibility of the expert’s testimony, the jury (or judge) must
understand the reasons why the expert has come to a certain opinion as to the case. In that
connection, Rule 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (and similar state rules) permits an expert
to disclose the underlying data and information that form the basis of her expert opinion (even
where such underlying information itself is inadmissible) if certain criteria are met and if the
disclosure’s probative value (in helping to explain the basis for the opinion of the expert)
substantially outweighs the prejudicial effect of the disclosure (that is, the jury’s tendency to rely
on the underlying data for its “truth”).

5

131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011).

It is in the context of this Rule 703 disclosure of underlying data (which Dexter was attempting
to employ) that the issue of the present debate arises. As discussed above, the Court has
previously found that forensic reports prepared by purportedly neutral analysts are testimonial
statements and that in order to introduce those statements the prosecution must comply with the
safeguards of the Confrontation Clause (which normally requires presenting the preparing
analyst for in-court cross-examination). This means that if the preparing analyst does not appear
to support the report, the court violates the rights of the criminal defendant under the
Confrontation Clause if the court admits the report and it is used against the criminal defendant.
At the same time, pursuant to Rule 703 and similar state rules, a separate independently qualified
expert may appear at trial and testify as to her independent opinion and then in certain
circumstances may also disclose the very same data through oral testimony that the
Confrontation Clause would otherwise appear to prohibit. For the reasons discussed below, I do
not believe that use of Rule 703, subject to some reasonable restrictions, violates a criminal
defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause.
Rule 703 and the Confrontation Clause
If properly interpreted, Rule 703 disclosure is wholly consistent with the rights of criminal
defendants under the Confrontation Clause (and Dexter could disclose the results of the report in
his testimony).
The central purpose of the Confrontation Clause is to grant the criminal defendant a right to face
and cross-examine her accuser. Rule 703 (or an analogous state rule) does not prevent the crossexamination of a sufficient witness. First, the accusatory statement should be viewed as being
made by the testifying expert rather than by the disclosed report (or the analyst who prepared the
report). Unlike in a case where the prosecution attempts to admit the actual report itself (which
the Court has found violates the Confrontation Clause), in a Rule 703 disclosure case the actual
report is never admitted and the disclosed information should not be used for its truth. Instead,
what is admitted is the opinion of the expert and the underlying data that helps to explain why
the expert holds the independent opinion that she holds. Thus, the proper witness to confront in a
Rule 703 disclosure case is the testifying expert, not the preparing analyst of the disclosed report.
Second, even if one is concerned that the underlying data could persuade the jury as to truth, the
expert is available for cross-examination as to the common problems associated with DNA and
other forensic tests. In fact, the expert should be sufficiently qualified with regard to the specific
tests, machines, and procedures involved in the case and thus would be in an excellent position to
answer questions regarding the accuracy of such tests and machines on cross-examination. The
right to confront is procedural (and does not necessarily ensure that the evidence presented is
credible). The testifying expert can sufficiently afford the defendant her procedural right.
Further, the residual concern regarding inappropriate uses of the disclosed underlying data by the
jury may be alleviated with a properly crafted jury instruction. The court could (and should)
make explicitly clear the reasons for allowing disclosure of the underlying data, the permissible
uses of such data, and the uses for which the jury should not use the data. Although there is
certainly a concern that jury instructions may not be wholly effective, jury instructions are
pervasively used in the laws of evidence and, in any event, an evaluation of the efficacy of jury
instructions is best left for a separate debate.

Finally, Rule 703 disclosure strikes a proper balance between the rights of the criminal accused
and the modern reality of law enforcement technology. Although law enforcement policy
concerns should not trump the clear Confrontation Clause rights of a criminal defendant, law
enforcement concerns are far from irrelevant (especially where the scope of the right is so
unclear). In modern forensic tests (such as DNA), multiple individuals are involved in the
analyses and tests, and labs are relied upon to facilitate tests for numerous cases. Although after
Bullcoming the prosecution may not enter the report of DNA analysis itself into evidence (absent
compliance with the Confrontation Clause), it would prove perhaps an even greater burden upon
criminal prosecutions (and the victims of criminal conduct) if an expert could not even support
her independent opinion with the facts and data from forensic reports (unless the prosecution
could locate an analyst to support each report upon which the expert bases her opinion in part).
Who could be available to conduct the required DNA and forensic tests while the preparing
analysts are appearing in court? What if the testimony stretched over multiple days? What if the
expert relies, in part, on each of fifteen external reports? The effects on law enforcement policy
would be substantial and should not be wholly ignored.
Rights Are Not Violated
For the reasons above, the criminal defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights are not violated
where a court allows an expert witness to testify regarding the results of forensic testing
conducted by a separate analyst who did not appear to testify at trial. Dexter should be allowed to
disclose.
Note: The opinions expressed in this article are solely the personal views of the author and
constitute neither legal advice nor the opinions of Cleary Gottlieb.

Part 2
Surrogate Witnesses Just Won’t Cut It: A Response to Ronald Coleman
Paul Rothstein
The hypothetical case based on the popular TV series Dexter, presented by Ronald Coleman, is
essentially the case of Williams v. Illinois, which will be heard by the Supreme Court on
December 6 and decided by the end of June. Coleman argues for one resolution of that case, I
another (irrespective of what the Supreme Court will actually do). I have great respect for
Coleman. His arguments are presented, reasoned, and documented extremely well, and they may
well carry the day in the Supreme Court. But I believe, nevertheless, that he is wrong on this
occasion.
Coleman’s Argument at Bottom
Coleman’s argument boils down to this: A particular witness should be able to testify in court
that another person told him something highly incriminating about the criminal defendant on
trial. That other person, Coleman argues, should not have to come forward and take the witness
stand and be cross-examined under oath and penalty for perjury.
This kind of second-hand incriminating of a defendant has been anathema to the AngloAmerican legal system ever since the sixteenth century, when England realized that an injustice
had been done to Sir Walter Raleigh. He had been convicted and executed for treason on just
such second-hand testimony—the report of what a person had said about him out of court. That
person later recanted, saying that if called to the witness stand, he would have told the truth. But
it was too late.
English law was changed as a result to ban such second-hand evidence. And America included in
its Constitution a clause providing that a criminally accused person shall have the right “to be
confronted [in open court] with the witnesses against him” so that the witness can be crossexamined, so that his demeanor can be scrutinized by the jury, so that he is under oath, so that a
penalty attaches if he perjures himself, and so that he has to look the accused the eye. In addition
to exposing his biases and exposing or preventing conscious fabrication, this procedure reveals
and makes less likely errors and mistakes of the witness. If we allow a testifying witness to
report what another person said, as Coleman wants, that other person is escaping this courtroom
confrontation. He is essentially an absent, invisible witness whose words are incriminating the
defendant, untested by courtroom safeguards.
Coleman Tries to Limit His Argument to Forensic Scientists/Analysts
Coleman limits his argument to the situation where the absent invisible witness is a forensic
scientist who had told the courtroom witness the incriminating information by means of a written
report, and the courtroom witness is himself an “expert”.

But should this make any difference? Is it really any different than a witness in a murder case
testifying that someone told him that he saw the defendant throwing a gun into a lake or burying
a body or that he saw the defendant at the scene of the murder moments before the murder?
Surely that would not be allowed. In either case, it is a witness testifying to a terribly
incriminating fact that someone else told him.
Why should a forensic scientist be treated any differently? In fact, the situation argued for by
Coleman is worse. Both the witness on the stand and the person he says told him the
incriminating information (the “forensic scientist”) work for the prosecutor and police and derive
a major part of their income from them. In other words, they have a real bias.
Coleman suggests that what a forensic scientist says is more trustworthy because he is a
professional and is reporting merely objective science.
Is Forensic Science “Objective”?
But science is not so objective. “Scientific” tests frequently involve judgment in resolving
ambiguities. Not only are such tests subject to biases; they are peculiarly prone to genuine errors
even when competently and honestly done. They can be extremely skewed by even a tiny lack of
competence. They depend very much not only on often subjective interpretations of the test data
but also on the care with which the samples were handled, kept uncontaminated, and segregated;
on precise calibration of the equipment; on scrupulous compliance with detailed protocols; etc.1
And the results can be consciously or subconsciously influenced by what the police or prosecutor
wants to hear. The National Academy of Sciences recently found that some of the most
frequently used forensic techniques are not nearly as objective and reliable as is commonly
believed.2 The academy pointed out multiple sources of inaccuracy. Moreover, of 250 false
1

“Administrative errors are far more common in a busy lab than anyone would understand who has not been in a
busy lab [as I have, repeatedly]. Leaving aside obvious sample-contamination issues, NOBODY runs a single
sample through a mass spectrometer that is designed to automate a run of 25 or 30 different samples—it’s too
expensive, too time consuming, and puts too much wear on the machines. In turn, that means that (a) the machine
needs to be accurately matching sample input with output, (b) the samples need to be properly identified before
going into the machine, (c) the test results need to be properly matched with the samples used to create them, (d) the
samples need to be properly handled and identified before getting into the laboratory, and (e) the test results need to
be properly identified on their way out of the laboratory. All of these problems are relevant to the particular
laboratory technician who runs a test. Last, and far from least, there’s lab technique. One does not throw that sample
scraped from under a victim’s fingernails into a machine and magically get The Answer. There’s a lot of human
preprocessing that has to be done, especially—but not only—if one is dealing with a mixture… which is the natural
state of things in the real world (as opposed to on TV). Here is where examining the lab technician is most valuable
to both the prosecutor (whose job, after all, is to do justice—not obtain a conviction, not get reelected or promoted)
and the defense. Returning to that sample scraped from under a victim’s fingernails for a moment, that sample
would need different treatment before throwing it into a multimillion-dollar gas chromatography machine if the
victim had been found floating in a back-yard chlorinated pool, pulled out of a saltwater harbor, or walked into an
emergency room. Unless one ensures that the sample was treated properly, the “science” doesn’t mean a whole lot.
(Then there’s the issue of what that kind of sample treatment will do to anything testing for concentrations, and
whether environmental factors brought in similar substances… but that’s for another time.) In summary, science is
in the results; getting the results is messy; and examining the getting of the results will often—perhaps too often—
raise reasonable doubt.” C.E. Petit, ABA Journal Law News Now, On-Line Posting #11, Dec. 1, 2011, following the
article “The Latest Test on the Confrontation Clause.”
2
Report, “Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States” (National Academies Press, 2009).

convictions as proven by subsequent DNA analysis, approximately 50 percent of them involved
faulty forensic evidence.3 Every several months we read in the newspaper about some
unscrupulous “forensic scientist” hell-bent on providing false information to please the
prosecution and obtain a conviction. Now is not the time to loosen safeguards involving forensic
evidence.
Thus, cross-examination of the analyst could reveal a lot. It should not be dispensed with. Crossexamining the person who takes the stand (whom we may designate a “surrogate” expert) to
report what the analyst—but not the analyst himself—found will not do the same job. That
person is unlikely to have all the facts pertinent to inaccuracy or fabrication. If the law dispenses
with calling the analyst to the stand and says there can be a substitute expert witness like
Coleman wants, a class of slick professional testifying surrogate “experts” will arise to report the
findings of the analyst. They will be adroit at parrying the thrusts of cross-examination.
But Would It Be Good Enough to Have a Well-Qualified Surrogate Witness?
Coleman suggests that we can safeguard against all this by insisting on requirements that the
testifying expert who testifies to what the analyst reported be a well-qualified expert familiar
with the general scientific technique employed, though not necessarily with the particular test
performed in this case. He suggests that this would provide an adequate basis for evaluating the
quality and veracity of the other analysts’ work.
But the testifying expert is too far removed from the actual test performed. We would not allow
cross-examination of one who overheard someone’s story of seeing the accused dump a gun in
the lake to substitute for cross examination of the person originally telling the story. Such crossexamination would be insufficient in many important respects.
Does the Confrontation Clause Allow for Different Regimes for Different Kinds of
Witnesses?
The literal language of the constitutional Confrontation Clause makes no distinction between
types of witnesses who must be presented for court confrontation, such as the distinction
suggested by Coleman between forensic analysts who do not need to be cross-examined and
“ordinary” witnesses, who do. Indeed, there is no coherent basis upon which such a distinction
could be made. The Supreme Court says that if information provided by the person is testimonial
in nature, the person must be presented at trial.4 In the case under discussion, the statement of the
out-of-court forensic scientist that the blood found at the scene has certain features (that match
defendant’s blood) is surely testimonial in nature, just as it would be if a witness said of a watch

3

Garrett, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (2011).
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) and the cases following therefrom, such as Davis v. Washington, 126
S.Ct. 2266 (2006), and Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011).
4

found at the scene that it had defendant’s initials on it.5 It is even more incriminating than the
initials and more in need of cross-examination.
Is the Only Witness for Purposes of the Confrontation Clause the Witness Who Actually
Testifies?
Coleman suggests that we should look at the situation under discussion as one in which the only
real witness testifying is the testifying expert and that as to her we do have confrontation and
cross-examination—she is here in court and her veracity and care can be thoroughly explored.
He suggests that the non-testifying analyst, whose report the testifying expert is including in her
testimony, is not really the evidence. He says that, since the analyst’s report itself is not being
introduced in evidence, it is only the basis upon which the testifying expert bases her testimony
that the blood matches the defendant’s.6 Thus, the only witness who needs cross examining is the
testifying expert. As she is being cross examined, there is no Confrontation Clause violation.
This seems to me to be mere sophistry. The lynchpin of the testifying expert’s testimony—
indeed of the whole trial—is the accuracy of the report by the non-testifying expert that the DNA
on the victim has such-and-such features (which turn out to be the same features as defendant’s).
If that is false, the whole case fails. The non-testifying expert has provided critical,
incriminatory, testimonial information about which he could be lying, mistaken, or worse.
Shouldn’t he be cross-examined? In effect, it is the same thing as if the report of the nontestifying expert is introduced into evidence, which Coleman concedes would require cross
examination of the analyst who wrote the report.7 What difference does it make how the jury is
apprised of what the report said—by the introduction of the report itself or by the testifying
expert telling the jury what the report said? In either case, it is the finding of the non-testifying
expert that speaks loudly and clearly to the jury. The purported distinction is a distinction
without a difference. It should make no difference to the need for cross-examination of the nontestifying expert that the testifying expert says, “I looked at his work, and I found it to be sound
and competently done, and I am therefore using it to base my conclusion on as well.” While this
adds something, it certainly does not add enough to obviate the need to cross-examine the
lynchpin, especially since the motivations of both experts are not above questioning.
The Rule 703 Principle
Coleman adds, to the last argument, that a well-recognized principle of evidence (Rule 703 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence and state and common-law analogues thereof) permits an expert to
incorporate, as part of her opinion testimony, reliance on what other non-testifying experts have
found, if that is reasonable, and that, if the judge finds that it is not too prejudicial, the findings
5

In the cases cited, the Supreme Court said that to be “testimonial” a statement has to have the purpose of use in a
criminal investigation or trial. In the case we are discussing, obviously that is the sole purpose of both the nontestifying lab analyst and the law enforcement personnel to whom he reported.
6
In Williams, the case under discussion, the testifying expert testified that the DNA found on the victim was
defendant’s. She testified that she did the DNA test on defendant and that an expert in an independent private lab
(i.e., the non-testifying analyst) did the test on the DNA found on the victim. The testifying expert compared these
two DNA profiles and concluded that they matched.
7
As he must. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009); Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct.
2705 (2011).

of the other experts can be told to the jury as part of the basis of the testifying expert’s testimony.
But the jury will then be instructed by the judge that it may consider the non-testifying experts’
findings only as they help the jury to evaluate the testifying expert’s opinion and cannot be
considered as being true. Coleman relies heavily on this last point—that because the jury will
not be taking the non-testifying expert’s findings as true (here, that the DNA on the victim had
certain features, that were then matched up with defendant’s), the veracity and accuracy of the
non-testifying expert need not be tested by confrontation and cross-examination.
But isn’t it a fiction that the jury can make any sense out of such an instruction in this kind of
case? It is clear to them that (and the prosecution intends that) the case hinges on whether the
jury believes that the DNA on the victim had such-and-such features as found by the nontestifying expert as related in the testifying expert’s testimony. The prosecution’s whole chain of
argument of guilt depends on this being true and accurate. The testifying expert’s opinion comes
to nothing if this lynchpin is not true. It is exactly as if the report of the non-testifying expert
itself were introduced into evidence, in which case Coleman concedes that controlling precedent
requires that the writer of the report be in court for cross-examination.8
I am not condemning the principle of Rule 703. Its principle may be more acceptable in civil
cases, for which it was primarily designed, or cases where on the facts the distinction between
the jury using the out-of-court material for its truth and for evaluating the testifying expert’s
opinion may be wider and more tenable. Further, it is not entirely clear that the Rule 703
principle would be applicable in this case to permit what Coleman wants. The rule gives the
judge power to disallow recounting of the basis if it is too prejudicial (as I am arguing here). Any
constitutional provisions like the Confrontation Clause trump rules of evidence.
Burdens on Law Enforcement
Coleman points to the “burden” on law enforcement if the analyst(s) doing the testing and report
had to come to the stand rather than a testifying “surrogate” expert in place of the analyst.
I would point out that a testifying surrogate expert will also cost money, and his courtroom
duties will similarly divert him from lab duties. Eventually, perhaps, a group of testifying experts
who specialize in parrying cross-examination will emerge, far divorced from real lab work. This
would be an undesirable result.
When the Supreme Court held that indigents had a right to counsel at state expense,9 the states
complained vehemently that the expense and burden of providing counsel would be ruinous. The
Supreme Court, however, was of the view that important constitutional rights cannot be
compromised by consideration of expense and inconvenience to government. And the
predictions of ruination by the burden did not come to pass.

8
9

Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, cited supra.
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).

Several things mitigate the burden on law enforcement.10
One burden mentioned by Coleman is that the original analyst might be long gone or dead by the
time of trial, and a requirement that he appear would mean that the prosecution must be dropped.
A solution might be for law enforcement to preserve samples so they could be tested again by a
new analyst who could testify. In some cases this may not be feasible. One example would be
autopsies. But in many other cases it would be feasible. Perhaps a rule requiring that the analyst
testify could have an exception if the analyst is genuinely unavailable and preservation of
samples was not possible.
Some states do require the analyst to testify, and the burden has not been ruinous.
The vast majority of criminal cases are settled with plea bargains, so the occasion for supplying
analysts to testify would not be as great as is pretended. While requiring analysts to testify
instead of surrogate witnesses may change somewhat the balance of power in plea bargaining, it
is not expected that the effect would be too significant.
States could enact notice and demand statutes, which the Supreme Court seems to have
approved.11 Several states have them, and several more are considering adopting them. Under
this and similar procedures, a defendant must request that the analyst appear, or his right to such
appearance is waived. It could be required that defendant file this request considerably in
advance of trial, giving the state time to plan and assign workloads allowing for the fact the
particular analysts must appear.
Defendants can waive their rights, either by not giving the notice and demand under such a
statute, or, if there is no statute, by an affirmative waiver. Waiver would reduce the occasions on
which the state must supply an analyst for testimony. Why would a defendant waive? Because
judges, particularly in sentencing, go harder on defendants who seem “unco-operative.”12 While
this is regrettable, it is so. Thus, defendants will waive if there would be no genuine grounds for
challenging the analyst. Nothing would aggravate judges more than a request that the analyst
10

Justices Ginsburg and Scalia in Bullcoming, supra, downplayed to burdens on law enforcement of requiring
testimony by the analyst preparing the report.
11
Melendez-Diaz, supra.
12
“There are many incentives pushing both lawyers and defendants toward plea bargains. An important one is that
most defendants are guilty and know it. Especially if they are repeat players in the criminal justice system, they
won’t take the chance of the analyst showing up; they’ll take the plea on a somewhat reduced charge. The innocent
defendants are the ones most likely to insist on trial—and that’s exactly when we’d want the analyst to be in court.
A second constraint is what many defense lawyers call the ‘trial penalty.’ Judges set most sentences, for both pleas
and trial convictions. A judge will penalize a defendant who rejects a sensible plea and insists on going to trial. I.e.,
even if the plea deal is for the charged crime, the sentence will be lighter pursuant to plea (partly because of the
prosecutor’s recommendation and partly because the judge will reward the pleading defendant) than after trial. The
third constraint is that attorneys necessarily charge defendants higher fees to go to trial than to settle a case by plea.
Contingent fees are unethical in criminal defense practice, so attorneys have to charge by the hour or by the stage of
the case (i.e., so much for a plea, so much if we go to trial, so much if you want an appeal after trial….) Defendants
won’t want to pay a whole lot more for a trial that will likely result in conviction and irritate the judge to boot. And
even among public defenders, who aren’t paid by the defendants, there will be strong pressures to continue pleading
cases. The defenders struggle to represent the current case load; they couldn’t possibly handle the type of go-to-trial
posturing that’s a worst case scenario here.” Deborah Merritt, ABA Journal Law News Now, On-Line Posting #16,
following the article “The Latest Test on the Confrontation Clause,” Dec. 1, 2011.

appear and then nothing helpful to the defendant emerges when he does appear. Or worse, all
kinds of new bad stuff against the defendant emerges. Sometimes it can be worse for the
defendant to insist on an appearance by a witness when the witness is articulate. Sometimes the
cold report is better for the defendant.

Part 3
More on Williams v. Illinois: A Response to Paul Rothstein
Ronald J. Coleman
In Part 2 of this debate, Professor Paul Rothstein presents a multitude of serious and justifiable
concerns (both constitutional and policy-based) with finding that the disclosure of underlying
data by a testifying expert does not violate the Confrontation Clause rights of a criminal
defendant. I also have a great deal of respect for Rothstein, but my good faith interpretation of
the issues involved is somewhat different from his.
My response to his concerns comes in four parts. First, in my view the only relevant “witness”
for the Confrontation Clause analysis is the testifying expert. Second, I believe that the testifying
expert is a sufficient witness to be cross-examined as to the matters with which Rothstein is
concerned. Third, it may be that the laws of evidence occasionally draw fine lines, and it may be
that juries have trouble following the rules prescribed for them, but juries and fine lines appear to
be the basis of our legal system. Finally, although judicial efficiency and law enforcement policy
concerns should not trump clear constitutional rights, law enforcement policy may be relevant
where the scope of the granted right is unclear. Requiring the appearance of any analyst who
prepares any data that forms even a small part of an expert’s testimony will pose too great a
threat to law enforcement.
The Only Relevant “Witness” Is the Testifying Expert
Rothstein is concerned by my suggestion that in cases such as Williams, the only witness of
relevance to the Confrontation Clause analysis is the testifying expert herself. Rothstein argues
that the information that forms the basis of the expert’s opinion should be considered a
testimonial statement for Confrontation Clause purposes because it will speak loudly to the jury.
I respectfully disagree.
To begin, consider a simple hypothetical situation (based on Williams) in which there is a
relatively small amount of external information that forms the basis of the testifying expert’s
opinion. The testifying expert has conducted DNA analysis on a criminal defendant. A nontestifying analyst in a different lab has conducted DNA analysis on the victim. The testifying
expert then uses her experience and judgment, views the results of both analyses, decides that
there is a DNA match, and testifies to that match in court. In this hypothetical, the only relevant
witness is the testifying expert, because she is the one who presents her opinion to the court. The
external analyst’s report is never entered into evidence and should be considered irrelevant to the
analysis (so long as the results are disclosed only for credibility purposes). If the prosecution
wanted to introduce the report itself, then the external analyst may become a Confrontation
Clause witness. However, an expert should be able to discuss the basis of her opinion (including
why her opinion is credible) without transforming that basis into the testimonial statements of a
second person. Alternatively, if the expert merely attempted to parrot the results of an external
report, without any substantial independent analysis, then I might agree with Rothstein that
introducing the results through a mere conduit witness may violate the Confrontation Clause. But

that is not the case here. As long as the expert is using her independent judgment, then it is the
expert who delivers the lynchpin in the case, not the person who prepared some of the data upon
which the lynchpin testimony is based.
Also consider that the finding of the Supreme Court on this issue will not be limited to situations
where only one (or a few) external reports are involved. If we accept Rothstein’s idea that all
compilers of data that form the basis of an expert’s opinion are actually Confrontation Clause
witnesses, then some lengthy trials will result. Consider a more extreme scenario than Williams
in which the testifying expert offers her opinion and bases that opinion on her independent
judgment (primarily) but also in part on twenty external forensic reports that were conducted by
outside labs. Would Rothstein really require the prosecution to produce the preparing analyst for
each and every small piece of data upon which the expert’s testimony rests in part? Would it
really aid the interests of justice to have the court’s time wasted in such a manner? Rothstein is
concerned that the jury will have difficulty differentiating between the issues that it should be
considering and those that it should not be considering. One thing that would concern me is that
if the jury were made to sit through such lengthy and potentially excruciating testimony, the jury
might become confused or bored and would not be focusing on the important issues in the case.
The Testifying Expert Is a Sufficient Confrontation Clause Witness
Rothstein is concerned with the fact that forensic science is not always objective and that a
testifying expert who relies in part on the forensic analysis of another cannot afford the criminal
defendant a sufficient means of cross-examination. Again, I must respectfully disagree.
Rothstein is wholly correct to argue that mistakes occur in the scientific context in the same way
as they occur in other contexts. Although science attempts to be as objective as possible,
individuals are careless, machines are not calibrated properly, or other human error occurs. This
does not necessarily mean, however, that the defendant needs the non-testifying analyst in court
to make this point. As discussed in my first article, the testifying expert may be cross-examined
on a multitude of issues: the number of false convictions based on DNA evidence, the fact that
analysts may occasionally be less careful, the fact that certain tests require human analysis and
are subject to human error, the fact that certain tests rely on the calibration of machines and the
competence to use them, and the fact that even a perfect analysis does not ensure a perfect result.
If the testifying expert were not qualified with regard to the specific machines, procedures, and
general testing conditions involved in the case, then I might be persuaded by Rothstein’s
argument that the testifying expert is insufficient. It may well be that there would be some
marginal benefit to cross-examining all analysts who prepared anything that formed the basis of
an expert’s opinion, but that does not mean that failing to produce such people should be deemed
a constitutional violation.
Moreover, although the Supreme Court may not find it relevant to the constitutional analysis,1 at
least at a policy level it is noteworthy that the defense may still subpoena the external analyst
who actually conducted the test. As Rothstein notes in his discussion of notice-and-demand
statutes, there are very few cases in which a defendant actually believes that a mistake has been
made. On the occasions where there is a serious concern with the accuracy of data, the defendant
1
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may subpoena the analyst. Although this may not alone satisfy the Constitution in all contexts, it
certainly mitigates Rothstein’s concern as to the mistakes of forensics science.
Juries and Fine Distinctions Are a Reality of Our Justice System
Rothstein suggests that the distinction between admitting evidence for its truth as opposed to as
the basis for ones opinion, and the introduction of a report into evidence as opposed to an expert
giving his opinion predicated in part upon the results of that report, will not be meaningful
because a jury will be unable to understand and comply with such rules. While Rothstein may in
fact be correct about this, such a concern appears to be better directed at the system of jury trial
generally rather than at the permissible scope of the Confrontation Clause specifically.
There is certainly a valid concern that a jury will not understand the finer rules of evidence. Our
system uses different rules in the laws of evidence predicated upon things that the jury may not
always fully understand. We expect the jury to be able to use different forms of evidence (oral
testimony in court, documentary evidence, admitted hearsay, etc.) and we expect the jury to
understand when it may consider information for truth and when it should only consider
evidence for another purpose, such as showing bias. It is probably true that jury members often
fail to properly make these fine distinctions. In fact, there is a quite large and growing body
literature to suggest that humans make mistakes, act on the basis of biases, and may not always
be able to properly understand and employ empirical and other information.2 However, the
moment we accept that juries are unable to make meaningful distinctions between the types of
evidence that they should be considering and the types of information that they should ignore, we
would probably have to seriously reconsider a system based on jury trial. The potential of a juror
to convict on the basis of the results of a report that is not admitted is much less concerning to
me than the potential for a juror to vote to convict because the defendant looks like an exgirlfriend. As long as we have a system that draws fine distinctions and relies on the discretion,
independence, and intelligence of the jury, we should not reinterpret the Constitution to reduce
the likelihood for the jury to make a mistaken use of evidence in this one discrete area.
Finally, although I do not believe that allowing Rule 703 disclosures is in fact bad policy, I
would certainly be willing to entertain an argument on policy grounds about why the jury should
not get to hear such evidence. If Rule 703 disclosures will seriously bias or confuse the jury (and
the balancing test in Rule 703 is itself insufficient to eradicate such concerns), then perhaps Rule
703 should be amended. But bad policy alone does not make a constitutional violation.
Law Enforcement Revisited
Rothstein argues that, as was the case with the right to counsel, law enforcement efficiency and
public resources concerns should not override the rights of a criminal defendant. As I mentioned
in Part 1, if I was convinced that Confrontation Clause rights attached to the disclosure of
underlying data, then I would agree that the clear constitutional rights of a defendant must not be
infringed. However, because I do not believe that the Confrontation Clause was intended to (nor
2
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should be read to) apply to such disclosures, the law enforcement burden is properly considered.
There are a few additional points on this issue that I wish to make.
To begin, consider a hypothetical situation similar to Williams but with several facts changed.
Analyst 1 (the testifying analyst) conducts DNA analysis on a defendant who has allegedly killed
a victim. Analyst 2 conducts analysis on the victim’s DNA. By the time of trial, Analyst 2 has
also died, the victim has been cremated, and the lab no longer has the sample. If Analyst 1 could
not disclose the fact that he based his opinion as to the match, in part, on the results of Analyst
2’s report (and we assume that such inability to disclose will seriously injure the prosecution’s
case), then the Confrontation Clause would be acting as an unanticipated form of statute of
limitations on murder.3
Moreover, while Rothstein is correct that the public will need to bear the cost of the actual
testifying expert, he must agree that the cost of producing the expert and the potentially twenty
other analysts who produced information that formed the basis of the analyst’s opinion would
cost the public substantially more. I am also less persuaded than Rothstein that a criminal
defendant would choose to waive his right to cross-examine a potential witness (under a noticeand-demand regime) simply to remain in the judge’s good graces. I could certainly imagine that
a criminal defendant may wish to demand that all the analysts appear in an effort to confuse the
jury or make the jury so tired of hearing scientific testimony that the jury chooses instead to
ignore the boring scientific information wholesale.
Notwithstanding the very important concerns highlighted by Rothstein, I am still convinced that
the Confrontation Clause is not violated in the present context.
Note: The opinions expressed in this debate are solely the personal views of the author and
constitute neither legal advice nor the opinions of Cleary Gottlieb.
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Part 4
Williams v. Illinois: Responses to Coleman’s Arguments
Paul Rothstein
I will address Coleman’s points set forth in Part 3, in sequence, using his headings.
The Only Relevant “Witness” Is the Testifying Expert
His first point under this is that the analyst who did the test, drew the conclusions, and prepared
the report that is fed to the testifying witness does not need to be cross-examined, because the
testifying expert is applying her own expertise to what the analyst has supplied her and she can
be cross-examined. I fail to see how that obviates the fact that there might be errors or purposeful
deception in the analyst’s work that would render erroneous not only the analyst’s work but also
the testifying expert’s opinion based thereon. It is true that the testifying expert may be able to
spot some of the shoddy or dishonest things in the analyst’s work. But a quick re-read of my list
in Part 2, of the kinds of inaccuracies that may infect the analyst’s work, will reveal that it is
unlikely that the testifying expert will be able to answer questions about most of them. The most
frequent answer, if the testifying witness is honest, will be “I don’t know.”
Coleman’s second point under this heading is that my position would be impracticable in a case
involving multiple underlying analysts. He says the logic of my position is that every analyst
who participated in any way in the chain of events that led to the report that is relied on by the
testifying expert, needs to be produced for cross-examination in court.
This is Coleman’s strongest point, and it may well be the one that, expressly or sub silentio,
inclines the Supreme Court to rule in his favor. (As I made clear in Part 2 above, I am not
sanguine that my position will carry the day in the current Supreme Court.)
But I think his point here has an answer. There will be some analysts in the chain whom I feel
would not need to be cross-examined. Some “analysts” perform only ministerial steps. For
example, they may be mere conduits for getting materials to a device. Or mere scriveners who
read and record machine-generated results. There will be other such minor participants. These do
not present as substantial credibility issues as the analysts whom I argue should be crossexamined.
The Testifying Expert Is a Sufficient Confrontation Clause Witness
Here Coleman argues that the testifying expert is a sufficient witness to cross examine, because
the testifying expert may be cross-examined on a multitude of issues: the number of false
convictions based on DNA evidence, the fact that analysts may occasionally be less careful, the
fact that certain tests require human analysis and are subject to human error, the fact that certain
tests rely on the calibration of machines and the competence to use them, and the fact that even a
perfect analysis does not ensure a perfect result.

But these all appear to a jury as theoretical “maybes.” Without showing what specific errors did
occur, this kind of talk is just hypothetical and has no teeth. We would not be satisfied, for
example, to allow a witness to testify that some person told him he saw defendant murder the
victim, and then say that we do not have to cross-examine the purported eyewitness because it is
enough to inform the jury of the possibility that people can lie or be mistaken.
Coleman’s final point under this heading is that we do not need to require the prosecution to
produce the analyst, because if there is something wrong with his analysis, the defendant can call
him to the witness stand. There are several replies to this:
•

As Coleman recognizes, the Supreme Court has clearly said that this right (the right to
“compulsory process” to produce witnesses for the defense) is not sufficient to obviate
the right to have the prosecution present witnesses.

•

Coleman would put the expense and difficulty of finding and producing the analyst, and
the risk of the analyst being dead or unavailable, on the defendant rather than the state.

•

The defendant is not likely to know whether there are specific errors in the analyst’s work
that would justify the defendant expending his usually limited resources on finding and
calling the analyst to the stand.

Juries and Fine Distinctions Are a Reality of Our Justice System
Coleman misconstrues my argument here, and perhaps it is my fault.
My argument here is not that the jury will find it difficult to follow an instruction not to consider
the report for its truth (but to consider it only for its value in evaluating the testifying expert’s
opinion). My argument is that both purposes are the same in a case like this. There is no
difference between the two uses. The instruction is incoherent nonsense in the present case.
Using the report to evaluate the testifying expert’s opinion that the blood samples are a match
necessarily involves deciding whether the report is true. It is the report that says the DNA on the
victim had the features that the defendant’s DNA turns out to have had. The testifying expert’s
opinion that it is a match is utterly and completely dependent on the truth of the underlying
report.
Even if the law of evidence has relied on the fiction that these two purposes can be kept separate,
should a life and death constitutional right depend on such irrationality? The Supreme Court in
Crawford took great pains to de-link the rules of evidence from the Confrontation Clause. At this
point in the argument, Coleman expressly concedes that the jury may not be able to make the
separation, but he says it is no worse than many other similar instances where the jury cannot
understand their instructions—and that the proper remedy would be to reform the law of
evidence. I fail to see how this supports further exacerbating the situation by introducing the flaw
into constitutional jurisprudence. Just because there are other things just as bad does not mean
that this is good.

Law Enforcement Revisited
Here Coleman first attacks my analogy to the right to counsel. I had said that law enforcement
always predicts catastrophe when new rights are recognized and did so when an indigent
criminal defendant’s right to counsel at state expense was first announced in the Gideon case. I
further said that the catastrophe did not come to pass. I said that inconvenience and expense to
law enforcement should not trump constitutional rights. Coleman agrees.
But Coleman says the distinction here is that the constitutional right is not clear and that, where
there is lack of clarity, it is appropriate to consider expense and inconvenience to law
enforcement. I am not sure why that should be so, but in any event, the right of indigents to be
supplied counsel at state expense was not clear when Gideon was handed down.
Coleman next posits a case where the underlying DNA analyst has died by the time of trial and
the state has not preserved the specimen for testing anew by a new analyst for purposes of trial.
Coleman says that under my view, which requires cross-examination of the original analyst,
there could be no trial, because he is dead. In effect, there would be an unwritten statute of
limitations on the crime imposed by my requirement of cross-examination of the analyst.
My answer to this is that the state should have preserved the specimen for retesting by a new,
live analyst who could be cross-examined. The impossibility of trial and the de facto statute of
limitations in Coleman’s hypo is the fault of the state.
Finally, Coleman returns to the practical problem of the state having to call multiple analysts in a
case where many may have been involved in the chain of analysis. I stated that there were
disincentives in the trial process to a defendant always insisting on his rights in this regard and
incentives to waive calling analysts—even if this burden on the prosecution were a proper
consideration in constitutional analysis. Coleman disagrees that there are these
incentives/disincentives to any appreciable degree. This is a disagreement over the realities of
what goes on in criminal defense work. I doubt that we can resolve this disagreement between
us.
Nevertheless, I think the Supreme Court in Williams may well go with Coleman on the issue
under discussion in this debate because of the perceived infeasibility of calling multiple analysts
in multiple-analyst cases. The Court may well allow a properly qualified expert surrogate witness
to testify based on the underlying report and disclose to the jury what the report concluded
without requiring the testimony of the underlying analyst(s). To do otherwise might get the Court
into what it might think will be too difficult or result in too many Supreme Court appeals: that is,
into either requiring all contributing analysts to testify or distinguishing between those who are
necessary and those who are not. I think the Court will find permitting a surrogate witness to be
the easiest answer. Hopefully they will impose some stringent requirements on the surrogate
witness regarding her expertise, knowledge of the pertinent processes and apparati, and at least
partial involvement in the particular process that led to her testimony.

